

The Samaritan's Curse Moral Individuals and Immoral Groups

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Abstract

In this paper, I revisit the question of how and in what sense can individuals comprising a group be held responsible for morally reprehensible behavior by that group. The question is tackled by posing a counterfactual: what would happen if selfish individuals became moral creatures? A game called the Samaritan's Curse is developed, which sheds light on the dilemma of group moral responsibility, and raises new questions concerning 'conferred morality' and self-fulfilling morals, and also forces us to question some implicit assumptions of game-theory.

Key words: The Samaritan's Curse, moral intention, conferred morality, Nash equilibrium

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